Realpolitik, significantly amplified by television, has recently conveyed a disheartening message worldwide – the European Union is not the global actor it claims to be.
The imbalanced transatlantic trade agreement demanded by US President Donald Trump was troubling enough.
Even more alarming is how the EU is being pushed to the sidelines regarding Ukraine and Gaza. Paris, Berlin, and London have carved out distinct roles in relation to Washington and Moscow, yet Brussels remains on the periphery.
It is unclear where the EU stands on addressing current conflicts and averting future ones.
Despite the rising geopolitical turmoil, the EU hasn’t articulated a cohesive stance on its security for two decades.
The longer this continues, the less authority it will wield.
Europe hasn’t always been directionless.
At the dawn of this century, the Union’s newly appointed ‘foreign minister’, Spanish politician and former NATO chief Javier Solana, introduced the EU’s first – and last – security strategy.
Those were relatively peaceful times; Solana opened his document with the assertion that “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure or so free.”
This sentiment starkly contrasts with today’s reality.
The EU must not only define the military and economic aspects of its own security but also its role in preserving stability in its vicinity and beyond.
This necessitates a reassessment of the Solana doctrine.
Ukraine’s future, alongside uncertainties in its relations with America, will inevitably urge EU member states to develop a collective security and defense strategy.
This involves resolving national rivalries and addressing specific vulnerabilities.
It also means acknowledging that EU members have yet to transcend their fragmentation.
Solana’s ambitious doctrine was, in truth, a reaction to the painful reality that conflict in the Balkans was not resolved by EU diplomacy – the so-called ‘Hour of Europe’—but rather by American resolve.
The EU must clarify not just the military and economic dimensions of its security but also its responsibilities for maintaining stability in its surroundings and further afield.
It should replace its ineffective neighborhood policy with a realistic combination of security and development approaches for Eastern Europe, North Africa, and the eastern Mediterranean.
The EU’s default approach of reacting to external events needs to shift towards a more proactive political process.
This requires a framework that enables Brussels to collaborate with member governments to create unified positions, either before crises or at early stages.
Some EU officials assert that such a framework already exists.
They argue that, instead of neglecting Solana’s security strategy, Brussels has developed a series of six mini-strategies focused on cyber issues, terrorism, defense industries, and more.
This, in itself, presents a challenge; these numerous, overly verbose, and poorly defined strategies muddle rather than clarify the EU’s security commitments.
Is it unrealistic to expect EU member states to negotiate a common security doctrine amid the current turmoil surrounding support for Ukraine and rearmament in general?
Clearly, the stronger argument is that Europe has reached a pivotal moment, and its geopolitical ineffectiveness will only increase if it fails to assert its security policies.
A comprehensive security doctrine would demand difficult intra-EU negotiations during a time when the Union is already under pressure.
Europeans have disappointingly limited their military support for Ukraine, yet their defense outreach promises to be unexpectedly robust.
Whether acting under NATO or EU frameworks, their armed forces have been constrained more by political issues than by operational weaknesses.
A “no-fly” policy to prevent Russian air assaults or the deployment of “tripwire forces” along Ukraine’s eastern borders have been delayed by political disputes rather than practical limitations.
The speed and nature of Europe’s defense renaissance remain uncertain. Nonetheless, it is the EU’s economic power that stands as its most formidable security asset.
Member governments have yet to wield it decisively, but it should be central to any security strategy.
Under the new EU doctrine, violations of long-standing international norms would automatically trigger potentially crippling trade and financial sanctions.
The standoff between Europe and the US regarding the future of roughly $300bn in frozen Russian assets highlights the EU’s uncertain application of economic tools.
The inconsistent enforcement of sanctions and the way major corporations have evaded them reveal a vulnerability.
A robust security doctrine would compel EU governments to bridge these divides.
A comprehensive security doctrine would necessitate challenging negotiations within the EU while it is already under stress.
However, a clear message to the Kremlin, the White House, and Beijing is long overdue.
It should unmistakably convey that Europe cannot be dismissed as passive in the face of nationalist and extremist pressures.
*The opinions expressed in this Frankly Speaking op-ed are those of the author and do not reflect those of Friends of Europe.
*This article first appeared on the Friends of Europe website and is reproduced with kind permission.
*The views conveyed by the author of this article, Giles Merritt, are not necessarily those of The Bulrushes.
