Binance has revealed its endorsement for Zilliqa’s EVM network, enabling ZIL deposits and withdrawals as the blockchain transitions away from its traditional transaction framework following a security incident that affected numerous accounts.
Summary
- Binance will swap ZIL from the legacy Zilliqa network to the Zilliqa EVM at a 1:1 ratio, managing the migration for users.
- Zilliqa is retiring its legacy transaction system due to a flaw in the Ledger app that compromised 6,772 accounts, resulting in the theft of at least 683.13 million ZIL.
- Trading of ZIL on Binance will remain unaffected, while future deposits and withdrawals will occur via the Zilliqa EVM.
- Self-custody holders will undergo a distinct zero-knowledge proof migration process designed to eliminate compromised legacy keys.
Binance has confirmed that ZIL will be shifted from the legacy Zilliqa mainnet to the Zilliqa EVM network at a 1:1 ratio, with the exchange managing the technical migration for users who hold the token on its platform.
Deposits and withdrawals through the legacy Zilliqa network have been on hold on Binance since August 5 at 01:00 UTC. Once the migration is complete, the exchange will resume ZIL deposits and withdrawals via the Zilliqa EVM without additional announcements.
After the migration, support for legacy Zilliqa deposits and withdrawals will cease. However, ZIL-related spot trading, margin trading, futures, and Binance Earn products will remain available throughout the transition.
This action by Binance is part of Zilliqa’s broader initiative to shift exchanges, custodians, and individual holders away from its outdated Schnorr-based transaction framework after detecting a vulnerability in the Zilliqa Ledger application that exposed some private keys.
Zilliqa migration initiated due to Ledger signing flaw
The transition comes in response to a vulnerability in Zilliqa’s Ledger application that affected native, non-EVM transactions signed using Ledger devices.
As reported previously, the issue was related to the generation of Schnorr signatures. Each signature requires a unique random number known as a nonce; however, the implicating application inadvertently duplicated the generated data in the signing buffer.
A post-mortem by Zilliqa on August 20 indicated that this flaw left the first 64 bits of each nonce set to zero, reducing the randomness necessary for key security. This vulnerability permitted an attacker to use multiple public signatures from the same account to recreate its private key.
This defect was present in every iteration of the Zilliqa Ledger application released from 2019 to 2026. Zilliqa noted that the first documented theft occurred on March 4, several months prior to the identification of the issue.
In July, instances of suspicious activity increased, leading KuCoin to alert Zilliqa on July 19 about unusual outgoing transactions from one of its cold wallets. Zilliqa suspended legacy transactions on July 20 and identified the source of the issue the following day.
The project confirmed that at least 683.13 million ZIL was unlawfully taken across 66 transactions. A total of 6,772 accounts were recognized as compromised, with 51 accounts completely drained. Zilliqa described these figures as minimum confirmed totals, as additional exposed accounts might still surface.
Initially, details were scarce when ZIL transfers were halted in July. At that time, Zilliqa announced that a partner exchange had suffered a theft from a cold wallet, but had not yet determined the method of the attack or the amount involved.
It is worth noting that Zilliqa EVM transactions remained unaffected by this vulnerability. The project clarified that software wallets utilizing its endorsed SDKs generated nonces correctly, and the recovery phrases stored on Ledger devices remained secure.
ZIL balances migrating to EVM addresses
Although fixing the Ledger application could avoid new weak signatures, Zilliqa acknowledged it could not safeguard private keys that had already been compromised through signatures stored on-chain.
Thus, the project decided to retire the legacy non-EVM transaction system and facilitate users’ migration to Zilliqa EVM. Balances will be reallocated at the protocol level to EVM addresses as legacy addresses are phased out.
Migrations for exchanges have been executed in batches, as each participating platform must provide and authenticate its EVM wallet addresses before balances can be reassigned.
The initial exchange migration hard fork occurred on September 2, transferring balances from legacy Schnorr-based wallets to EVM addresses provided by participating exchanges.
This initial batch included KuCoin, MEXC, OKCoin, Binance US, Bitvavo, Korbit, Indodax, Bitrue, WhiteBIT, CoinSpot, and CoinSwitch. Users storing ZIL on these exchanges needed to take no further action.
A second hard fork was scheduled for September 22, involving CoinEx, HTX, Bitkub, GOPAX, Coinone, OKX, LBank, Crypto.com, Gate, Paribu, CEX.IO, and Bitget.
Participation from Bybit and Bithumb was anticipated for a third migration hard fork, with Zilliqa confirming that discussions with other platforms were ongoing to gather and validate address mappings.
Binance had previously been excluded from the earlier batches, but its recent announcement now confirms the exchange will no longer support the old network and will reallocate its ZIL deposit and withdrawal framework to Zilliqa EVM.
Self-custody holders have an alternative ZIL migration pathway
Not only exchange customers will be affected by the phase-out of legacy addresses.
Zilliqa has implemented a zero-knowledge proof-based migration mechanism for users who retain ZIL in their legacy wallets. This system enables holders to verify ownership of an old address and transfer the corresponding balance to an EVM address without revealing their seed phrase or private key to Zilliqa.
In a September update, Zilliqa announced that the audit of the ZKP migration tool has been completed, followed by internal testing. The rollout of this tool is anticipated on September 22, coinciding with the activation of an escrow contract necessary for the migration process.
The project has advised users against attempting to shift funds via compromised legacy keys. If an attacker regenerates a private key using prior signatures, both the rightful owner and the attacker could authorize transactions from the account.
As a preventive measure, legacy transactions have been disabled for all holders, including accounts that were never compromised. Zilliqa indicated that the suspension of the old transaction system has helped thwart access to funds for attackers with reconstructed keys while finalizing the migration process.
Balances associated with ZIL that were already stolen during the incident are handled separately and will not be automatically restored through the exchange migration hard forks.
Zilliqa is working with exchanges and law enforcement to trace the stolen assets. The post-mortem indicated that an exchange account used to liquidate part of the robbed funds has been identified and frozen, and the project is coordinating with the Singapore Police and a law firm on the recovery efforts.
The team has also proposed a community vote regarding modifications to ZIL tokenomics, which could involve minting tokens to compensate affected holders. Zilliqa will provide further information on eligibility, amounts, and mechanisms alongside the governance proposal, as any new issue would alter ZIL’s supply.
Zilliqa EVM established as the network’s primary environment
Zilliqa’s shift to EVM infrastructure commenced prior to the Ledger incident.
The blockchain transitioned to Zilliqa 2.0 in June 2025, introducing complete Ethereum Virtual Machine compatibility, a proof-of-stake consensus model, and modifications to the network architecture.
The six-month testing phase enlisted 21 external validators, with the proto mainnet successfully processing 7.5 million blocks and completing 15 client upgrades before the transition.
Support for legacy transactions persisted after the launch of Zilliqa 2.0 as the blockchain maintained both its old native transaction framework and its EVM environment.
Zilliqa indicated that the Ledger incident hastened a decision it had been contemplating to fully retire the old infrastructure. The project considered the legacy stack as an increasingly significant development and security risk, asserting that Zilliqa EVM would function as its sole production environment.
This security incident followed several previous technical challenges involving the blockchain; however, Zilliqa has not tied those outages to the Ledger vulnerability. A network outage in January 2025 was linked to issues with lookup nodes, while a separate bug in September 2024 disrupted block production.
Zilliqa’s post-mortem revealed that the patch for the Ledger application was submitted on July 24 and merged by a Ledger engineer on July 27. The updated version restores full nonce generation for new signatures, although any private keys already compromised through earlier legacy signatures must be retired.






